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Abstract: Defamation law is a long-standing research focus. Previous studies on
defamation law have pointed out the importance of balancing two fundamental
issues in law, namely, protection of reputation and freedom of speech. The
present corpus-based legal study, using ConcGram 1.0 as the analytical tool,
examined the phraseological profile of reported cases on defamation in Hong
Kong in order to find out the types of defense and the approach to meaning in
the defamation case law in Hong Kong. Regarding defenses to a defamation
claim, the results show that fair comment, qualified privilege, and justification
are the most prevalent types, that unintentional defamation is not used at all,
and that there has been a noticeable shift from fair comment to honest comment.
As for the approach to meaning, the ordinary and natural approach is found to
be a pivotal means of solving the threshold problem in defamation cases, that is,
whether the words involved are defamatory or not.
Keywords: defamation, case law, defenses, Hong Kong, corpus approach,
linguistic evidence
1 Introduction
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereafter Hong Kong) is now in
the second decade of its establishment since the handover on 1 July 1997, having
a closer connection with the People’s Republic of China (hereafter as PRC) in
terms of her developments in economy, politics, and law. It was considered high
time to examine the systems of law in Hong Kong in order to shed light on how
the transition of sovereignty from Britain to PRC has affected the legal system of
Hong Kong. Among different types of law in the common law jurisdictions,
defamation law is indispensable. In Hong Kong, the number of case law on
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defamation is greater than any other tort (FitzGerald and Leung 2007). In Hong
Kong, defamation law generally follows the English traditional law of defama-
tion. As noted by Cottrell (2003: 39), “the law of defamation in Hong Kong is
basically identical to that of the United Kingdom before the enactment of the
latter’s Defamation Act 1996 (UK).” However, it has been noted that in some
post-handover defamation cases, the courts in Hong Kong do not follow the
English tradition (e.g., Albert Cheng And Another V. Tse Wai Chun Paul [2001];
Next Magazine Publishing Ltd And Another V. Ma Ching Fat [2003]), and that the
authorities from other jurisdictions may not necessarily apply to the defamation
cases in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong after the handover, in addition to case law in
the form of precedents recorded in Hong Kong Law Reports and Digest, the
governing legislations on defamation are, namely, the Basic Law of Hong Kong,
Bill of Rights Ordinance, and Defamation Ordinance.1 The present study is,
however, more interested in examining case law, which includes the law made
by the judge through precedents over time.
Studies of defamation law in common law jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom, Australia, and the PRC (e.g., Carter-Ruck 1990; Collins 2010; George
2006; Liebman 2006; McNamara 2007; Milo 2008; Norrie 1995; Pember and Calvert
2006; Rolph 2008) suggest a dichotomy between freedom of speech and protection
of reputation. Some studies (e.g., George 2006; Liebman 2006; Pember and Calvert
2006) find that the overprotection of reputation in defamation law has curtailed or
even threatened freedom of speech. Other studies (e.g., McNamara 2007; Milo
2008; Rolph 2008) argue that defamation law should provide greater protection
for reputation rather than overemphasizing freedom of speech. Similarly, in Hong
Kong, studies conducted to examine defamation cases that involve the media (e.g.,
Collins 2010; Cottrell 2003; Docherty 2000; Weisenhaus et al. 2007) contend that in
media defamation cases, it is essential to strike a balance between freedom of
speech and protection of reputation. An important finding of these studies is that
maintaining such a balance is heavily dependent on two main issues, namely, the
nature of the defenses to defamation and the approach to meaning. Defenses to
defamation refer to grounds such as fair comment, justification, and privilege that
are used to defeat a defamation claim (e.g., Liebman 2006; Mau, 2010; McNamara
1 These legislations differ in their emphases: Article 27 of the Basic Law focuses on freedom
of speech; Bill of Rights Ordinance aims to strike a balance between the freedom of expres-
sion and protection of reputation (Article 16); Defamation Ordinance distinguishes between
libel and slander and lays down some defenses such as fair comment, qualified privilege,
and justification. These written laws established by legislature are relatively stable and
limited.
2 Le Cheng et al.
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2007; Milo 2008; Rolph 2008). The approach to meaning is concerned with how to
determine the meaning of words or statements in defamatory dispute cases (e.g.,
Chan 2003; Nicholson 2000; also see Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd and Anor v. Ming
Pao Holdings Ltd and Ors, CACV [2010] 139; Bouwer and Others v Tea and Coffee
Distributors EP CC and Another (1225/2002) [2011] ZAECELLC 7; Jeyaretnam Joshua
Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 2 SLR 310). For instance, in discussing the
judgment of McDonald’s v. Steel dated March 31 of 1999, in which the English
Appellate Court overruled the trial court on the application of the law to some of
the allegedly defamatory statements, Nicholson (2000: 32) notes that it is correct,
according to the traditional English approach to defamation cases, to determine
the “natural and ordinary” meaning of the words. However, Nicholson (2000: 55)
also notices that there is not always just one “natural and ordinary” meaning of
the words, because the same words may be understood differently by “ordinary
persons,” given the context and circumstances; similarly, Cheng and Cheng (2014)
have noted that legal interpretation is a socio-semiotic enterprise. In the High Court
of Hong Kong on a trial of defamation,2 it was heard that the Plaintiff, relying
“solely on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words” in a paragraph
(Paragraph 2), objected to the words. From the viewpoint of the Judge, “the choice
of the court is to ascertain the ordinary and natural meaning of Paragraph 2 and to
decide out of the 3 possible choices, which is the ordinary and natural meaning of
the relevant words.”
A review of the literature shows that previous studies have concentrated on
a few areas: specific defenses of defamation in single defamation cases, how
specific words and statements in a defamation case are interpreted differently,
and how different meanings are negotiated by different parties. Some studies
adopt the method of case study (e.g., Liebman 2006; Chen and Ang 2008) in
their analysis of defamation cases in other jurisdictions. Others (e.g., Collins
2010; Cottrell 2003; George 2006; Mau 2010; Weisenhaus et al. 2007) conduct
discourse analytical research of the defamation law with a primary focus on the
merit of the law itself. The importance of integrating linguistic and legal ana-
lyses to better understand legal genres has been noted (e.g., Bhatia 2004;
Mellinkoff 1963; Gibbons 2003). Mellinkoff (1963: vi), for example, argues that
“the law is a profession of words,” emphasizing that the actual substance of
legal norms is dependent on the linguistic realizations. In other words, the
binding nature of legal rules is inextricably linked with the wording, and the
related interpretation, of the legal norms.
2 Nam Tai Electronics, Inc. V. Pricewaterhouse Coopers Hca [2000] 6783; Reported in: [2005] 2
HKLRD 461.
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In the field of corpus linguistics, knowledge about the patterns of word co-
selection in a corpus enables the researcher to better understand how meanings are
created (Sinclair 1996). Words do not remain “perpetually independent in their
patterning” (Sinclair 2004: 30). Instead, it is rather the phraseological tendency of
natural language that makes words co-select to create meaning (Sinclair 2004).
As a result, some word combinations are intrinsically “more privileged – more
frequent, more meaningful, more significant – than others” (Philip 2011: 36). In
the present study, identifying the phraseological profile, defined as “all of the
word associations in a corpus” (Warren 2010: 181), of the case law on defamation
in Hong Kong can, therefore, reveal objectively the nature and pattern of form-
meaning that are characteristic of defamation judgments as a genre. Findings
will then make it possible to describe essential elements of defamation case law,
including the medium of defamation, defenses to defamation, and the approach
to the meaning of words.
The present inter-disciplinary study of legal language and communication
examines a specialized corpus of defamation cases in Hong Kong so as to
better understand “the characteristics of the genre” (Sinclair 2001: xi). It
examines “the full evidence of the corpus” and “analyses the evidence with
the aim of finding probabilities, trends, patterns, co-occurrences of elements,
features or groupings of features” (Teubert and Krishnamurthy 2007: 6). This
corpus-based study aims to find out and describe the phraseological profile
and pattern (Sinclair 1996, 2004; Hunston 2002; Cheng et al. 2006, 2009) that
construe meanings in defamation cases in Hong Kong, and to provide new
insights to the legal portrayal of the defamation case law in Hong Kong, and
elsewhere, particularly related to the two important issues in defamation law:
the nature and types of defenses to defamation and the approach to meaning.
In examining the defenses to defamation, the lexical frequency and relative
distribution of word co-selections specific to different types of defense in Hong
Kong defamation case law were compared with those as prescribed in
Defamation Ordinance. The purpose was to determine prevalent kinds of
defense in Hong Kong defamation cases and to describe any changes in
defamation case law with reference to Defamation Ordinance. In examining
the approach to meaning of words, word co-selections in the specialized
corpus were analyzed to find out how different participants in the court in
Hong Kong, such as the court, the lawyer, and the litigants, negotiate mean-
ings in their determination of the meaning of statements in defamation cases.
Such an evidence-based linguistic study should provide some useful guide-
lines for the legal practitioners in Hong Kong as well as those in other common
law jurisdictions.
4 Le Cheng et al.
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2 Methodology of study
Most of the defamation cases in the common law jurisdictions, with Hong Kong
as an example, are civil cases because defamation in these jurisdictions is
governed by common law or tort law rather than criminal law. In Hong Kong,
in the normal course of events, a judgment is published on the website of the
Hong Kong Judiciary3 within three working days of its being received. Cases of
great importance or public interest are placed under “Newly Added Judgments”
on the same day of their delivery. In the database on the website, judgments that
are of significance as legal precedents on points of law, practice, and procedure
of the courts and of public interest from the courts (for Court of Final Appeal
since its establishment in 1997) delivered since 1946 (judgments of civil actions
before High Court) are available.
Reported defamation cases for this study were retrieved by using the lexical
search engine on the website of the Hong Kong Judiciary. First of all, search
words, namely, defame, libel, slander, and their inflectional and derivational
words (e.g., defamation, defamatory, defamed and defaming for defame) were
entered to identify relevant cases. Then all the cases were checked manually
based on four criteria, namely, whether they are defamation cases; whether they
are reported cases; whether the jurisprudential value of the cases was high; and
whether the cases are in English. The corpus (approximately 500,000 words)
consisted of 58 reported English defamation judgments from June 1993 to
February 2010, six of which were before 1997 obtained from the High Court in
Hong Kong (consisting of the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance)
and the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong. In order to better interpret and
explain the results of the study of defamation reported cases in Hong Kong, the
wider socio-cultural and political backgrounds of Hong Kong will be considered
(Bhatia 2004).
This study used the method of concgramming (Cheng and Cheng 2014;
Cheng et al. 2006, 2009; Greaves 2009; Greaves and Warren 2007) to identify
both word co-selections and phraseological variation in the corpus of reported
defamation cases in Hong Kong. The phraseological lexical engine ConcGram 1.0
(Greaves 2009) was used. ConcGram 1.0 was designed specifically to fully and
automatically find co-occurrences of words and/or phrases across a word span
irrespective of consistency variation and positional variation (Cheng et al. 2006,
2009). The unique strength of ConcGram 1.0 lies in its capability of extending the
3 http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/.
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notion of keyness beyond keywords to include a fuller range of phraseology by
revealing the co-selections in a given corpus (Warren 2010: 181).
With ConcGram 1.0, first, the automated functions of unique words and
exclusion list, with the latter automatically excluding the top 50 grammatical
words in the British National Corpus (Ahmad 2005) from being searched, were
used to generate a unique (i.e., single) word list. Second, the user-nominated
function was used to generate two-word and three-word concgram lists for a
more extensive analysis of certain word combinations. A concgram includes all
instances when one or more words are found between the co-occurring words
(i.e., constituency variation), and if the co-occurring words are in different
positions relative to one another (i.e., positional variation), e.g., “play a role,”
“play a key role,” “have a role to play” (Cheng et al., 2006, 2009). Third, the
concordances for certain congrams were studied to better understand the
semantic and functional meanings (Sinclair 1996) associated with the con-
cgrams. In this way, the use of ConcCram 1.0 enables the examination of corpus
data to reveal the co-selections of words made by writers of the reported
defamation cases in order to determine and quantify the phraseological profile
of the language contained within the corpus and hence the ways in which
meanings are created and expressed in the corpus.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Predominant words and meanings of judgments
of reported defamation cases
Table 1 lists the most frequent 50 lexical words in the half-million-word corpus
of English defamation civil cases in Hong Kong, enabling an understanding of
the prevalent ideas, and hence meanings, of the judgments of reported defama-
tion cases captured in the corpus.
From the analysis of the unique lexical words of the judgments of reported
defamation cases, three main findings are observed. First, the co-selection of Hong
(47th) and Kong (48th) indicates that the corpus is about defamation cases in Hong
Kong rather than from other jurisdictions. Second, being one type of courtroom
discourse, the defamation judgments contain a number of lexical words (30 of the
50 [60%]) characteristic of procedural law. These words are COURT, plaintiff(s),
case, law, defendant(s), evidence, APPEAL, Article, judge, action, order, judgment,
right, section, view, question, decision, person, Ordinance, proceedings, issue, claim,
justice, application, courts, costs, held, and tribunal. This finding confirms that
6 Le Cheng et al.
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defamation judgments, as a type of judicial discourse (Cheng 2010a, 2010b), share
the same set of registral lexis (Wong and Sin 2003; Cheng 2010a) with other
judgments in criminal and administrative cases. Third, the remaining 18 lexical
words include acts of the defamer (made, said and state[d]), media of defamation
(letter, words, matter, and statement), defense-related issues (fact, comment, immu-
nity, fair, malice, damages, trade, defense, and public), and the meaning of state-
ments (meaning), all of which contribute to the construction of essential elements
of defamation, namely, defamatory statements, identification (third-party recogni-
tion), publication (accessible to third party), fault (strict liability, actual malice or
negligence in different stages and contexts), falsity, and injury to reputation.4
Table 1: Top 50 lexical words in the corpus of reported defamation civil cases in Hong Kong.
rank word Freq. Percentage rank Word Freq. Percentage
 COURT , .  fact  .
 Plaintiff , .  letter  .
 case , .  person  .
 law , .  words  .
 Defendant , .  matter  .
 evidence , .  comment  .
 Hong , .  immunity  .
 Kong  .  damages  .
 APPEAL  .  trade  .
 plaintiffs  .  defense  .
 made  .  fair  .
 said  .  Ordinance  .
 Article  .  proceedings  .
 defendants  .  issue  .
 judge  .  claim  .
 action  .  justice  .
 order  .  application  .
 judgment  .  courts  .
 right  .  statement  .
 section  .  stated  .
 view  .  malice  .
 state  .  costs  .
 question  .  held  .
 public  .  tribunal  .
 decision  .  meaning  .
4 Hong Kong Defamation Ordinance.
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3.2 Phraseological profile of defenses to defamation
In Hong Kong, defenses to a defamation claim laid down in Defamation
Ordinance are, namely, unintentional defamation,5 justification,6 fair comment,7
and privilege (including qualified privilege).8 In order to find out whether these
defenses are borne out by the 58 reported defamation civil cases in the corpus,
two-word concgrams with “defense” (N = 434, 0.09%) as the origin were gener-
ated (Table 2).
The top five co-selected words with defense are fair, privilege, qualified, justifica-
tion, and malice (Table 2), showing that fair (comment), qualified privilege, and
justification are the most common types of defenses to defamation in Hong
Kong. This finding confirms that the defenses in defamation cases in Hong
Kong basically conform to the prescription in Defamation Ordinance.
As described, in defamation law, in order to strike a balance between free-
dom of speech and protection of reputation, a defense is usually employed as a
mechanism to constrain the overprotection of reputation. Lord Nicholls, for
instance, remarked that reputation was over-emphasized in the history of defa-
mation law:
Historically the common law has set much store by protection of reputation.
Publication of a statement adversely affecting a person’s reputation is actionable.
Table 2: Top 20 two-word concgrams with defense as the origin.
rank Origin co-selection freq. rank origin co-selection freq.
 defense fair   defense Should 
 defense privilege   defense Only 
 defense qualified   defense Law 
 defense justification   defense defamatory 
 defense malice   defense established 
 defense such   defense Judge 
 defense out   defense Made 
 defense no   defense plaintiff 
 defense defeat   defense So 
 defense may   defense evidence 
5 See Section 25 of the Defamation Ordinance (Cap. 21); HCA2140/2008 & HCA597/2009.
6 See Section 26 of the Defamation Ordinance (Cap. 21).
7 See Section 27 of the Defamation Ordinance (Cap. 21).
8 See Section 13, Section 14, Section 28 and the Schedule of the Defamation Ordinance of the
Defamation Ordinance (Cap. 21).
8 Le Cheng et al.
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The plaintiff is not required to prove that the words are false. Nor, in the case of
publication in a written or permanent form, is he required to prove he has been
damaged.9
This shows that truth or justification via proof of truth is a complete defense
but the burden of proof lies on the defendant. Such a rigorous, reputation-
protective principle has been found to cause a “chilling effect” for the potential
penalties on the persons who distribute arguably defamatory statements (e.g.,
Collins 2010; Liebman 2006; McNamara 2007), and thus curtailing the freedom
of expression and possibly preventing useful information from being dissemi-
nated, as the information distributor has to ensure its truth in advance. This
undoubtedly causes a price to pay for the protection of reputation. The law,
therefore, invents the notion of “fair comment” as a defense. The right of fair
comment, as a cornerstone in defamation law, is “one of the essential elements
which go to make up our freedom of speech. We must ever maintain this right
intact. It must not be whittled down by legal refinements.”10
Another finding is that among the top twenty two-word concgrams, no word
co-selection is found between defense and unintentional. The nominated search
function was then used to search for any co-selection of defense and uninten-
tional but no instances were found. In fact, no occurrence of unintentional was
found in the corpus. It can, therefore, be concluded that unintentional defama-
tion is not implemented as a defense in Hong Kong case law, possibly because it
is difficult for a defendant to prove his own unintentional defamation based on
certain evidence. In addition, the unintentional defamation allows a defendant
to make an offer of compensation by publicly withdrawing innocently published
defamatory words in order to avoid liability (Mau 2010). In other words, the
defense of unintentional defamation usually occurs before a dispute goes to the
court, which can account for no occurrence of unintentional defamation in
defamation judgments as a type of courtroom discourse in the corpus.
3.2.1 From fair comment to honest comment
As discussed, Table 2 gives us a prime facie impression that fair comment,
qualified privilege, and justification are the primary defenses to defamation in
Hong Kong case law. The concordance lines of “defense/fair,” “defense/privi-
lege,” and “defense/justification” were then studied to describe the patterning of
word association specific to the three types of defense.
9 Per Lord Nicholls in REYNOLDS V TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED [1999] 3 WLR 1010.
10 Per Lord Denning in Slim V. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157; [1968] 1 All ER 497.
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A close examination of the concordance of “defense/fair” (N = 154) shows that
the phraseology thGGe defense of fair comment is frequent (N = 97, 63%;
Figure 1).
In Hong Kong before Albert Cheng, as in England, the defendant has the
burden of proof of the elements of the defense of fair comment, but the defense
can be defeated if the plaintiff proves malice on the part of the defendant
(Mau 2010). The accepted core of fair comment is the right of any person to
comment on matters of public concern, provided that the comment is based on
identifiable and true (or privileged) statements of fact (Cottrell 2003).
According to Section 27 of Defamation Ordinance:
in an action for libel or slander in respect of words consisting partly of
allegations of fact and partly of expression of opinion, a defense of fair comment
shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation of fact is not
proved if the expression of opinion is fair comment having regard to such of the
facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as are proved.
In defamation cases, the defendants may include individuals, body entities
(including universities), and corporate entities (including news media compa-
nies). For the news media, they may defend in defamation cases by (qualified)
privilege, but for the defendants in general (including news media), what they
can use to protect themselves is usually fair comment. As an important safe-
guard for freedom of speech, fair comments facilitate and justify fair and honest
comments on public matters. Fair comments also make it possible for people to
discuss these matters fairly, freely, and openly without fear of liability, just as
held per Justice Li in Albert Cheng:11
10             root cause of the difficulty here is that the defense of fair comment is bedevilled by its name and by 
11       warrant for thus cutting down the scope of the defense of fair comment.  Disinterestedness cannot always 
12          which falls within the objective limits of the defense of fair comment can lose its immunity only by 
13  with the understanding that when considering the defense of fair comment they were entitled to 
14       Now, the reason why malice would defeat the defense of fair comment is that a person, although the 
15     courts should adopt a generous approach to the defense of fair comment:  “In a society which greatly 
16      law should not adopt a narrow approach to the defense of fair comment.  See Eastern Express Publisher 
17         which falls within the objective limits of the defense of fair comment can lose it immunity only by 
18                    was insufficient of itself to defeat the defense of fair comment, as this Court had held in Cheng 
19         in the light of the present law relating to the defense of fair comment as stated in Cheng Albert, 
20      the appeal is concerned with no more than the defense of fair comment, and damages is relevant to that 
Figure 1: Sample concordance lines from the two-word concgram “defense/fair”.
11 Albert Cheng And Another V. Tse Wai Chun Paul; Reported in: [2000] 3 HKLRD 418; (2000) 3
HKCFAR 339.
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Freedom of speech (or the freedom of expression) is a freedom that is
essential to Hong Kong’s civil society. It is constitutionally guaranteed by the
Basic Law (art. 27). The right of fair comment is a most important element in
freedom of speech. The courts should adopt a generous approach so that the
right of fair comment on matters of public interest is maintained in its full vigor.
As long as a defense of fair comment is established, the burden of proof will
be shifted onto the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s malice in order to defeat
such a defense. The frequent occurrence of the defense of fair comment in the
corpus (N = 97, 63%) shows that the most important defense in the defamation
cases in Hong Kong is whether or not a comment is fair, and this finding can be
verified by examining the co-selection patterns of comment (Table 3). As shown
in Table 1, the word comment (N = 484, 0.10%) is frequent in the corpus, with
“comment/far” and “comment/defense” (Table 3) being the most frequent co-
selections.
The adjectives that are co-selected with comment at N-1 (see Table 4 and
Figure 2) are discussed, as follows:
Table 3: Top 10 co-selections with comment as the origin.
Rank Origin co-selection freq.
 Comment Fair 
 Comment Defense 
 Comment Must 
 Comment Fact 
 Comment Facts 
 Comment Public 
 Comment One 
 Comment Made 
 Comment Whether 
 Comment Matter 
Table 4: Adjectives co-selected with comment at N-1.
Adjective Freq. Adjective Freq. Adjective Freq.
Fair  Brief  misleading 
honest  discrete  online 
concluding  Earlier  pungent 
defamatory  journalistic  permissible 
political  Mere  stinging 
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Table 4 shows a big difference in the frequencies of fair comment (N = 242) and
honest comment (N = 6), indicating that fair comment is the most frequent
defense in Hong Kong defamation cases. As for honest comment, the phrase
was found to be used for the first time in Hong Kong in 2000 in Albert Cheng,12 in
which Lord Nicholls stated that:
This is an appeal in a defamation action. It raises an important point on the
defense of fair comment. The title of this defense is misleading. Comment, or
honest comment, would be a more satisfactory name. In this judgment I adhere,
reluctantly, to the traditional terminology. (para 15)
Lord Nicholls then proceeded to deal with the outer limits of the defense
(fair comment)13 and concluded that the burden of establishing that a comment
falls within these limits, and hence within the scope of the defense, lies upon the
defendant who wishes to rely upon the defense. In other words, Lord Nicholls
herein implicitly advocates the use of honest comment rather than fair comment.
3.2.2 Qualified privilege
The two-word concgram “defense/privilege” occurs 56 times and the three-word
concgram “defense/qualified/privilege” 51 times, showing that qualified privilege
312        f’s case. I will return to this matter. Honest Comment 91. Although the judge was not at fault, his dire 
313       lines. I repeat that on a new trial both honest comment and Reynolds privilege could be advanced as defenc 
314    tends that the words so understood contain honest comment on a matter of public interest based on facts whic 
315    f this defense is misleading. Comment, or honest comment, would be a more satisfactory name.  In this judgm 
316     Lord Nicholls says it should be relabelled honest comment. 127. For the respondent Mr Michael Thomas SC arg 
317       inapplicable to the defense of fair (i.e. honest) comment.  So to hold would be consistent with the freedom
Figure 2: Sample concordance lines from the two-word concgram ‘comment/honest’.
12 Albert Cheng And Another V. Tse Wai Chun Paul. All the traceable judgments using “honest
comment” in Hong Kong Judiciary website are delivered after 13 November 2000, when the
judgment of Albert Cheng was handed down.
13 First, the comment must be on a matter of public interest. Second, the comment must be
recognizable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact. Third, the comment must be
based on facts which are true or protected by privilege. Next, the comment must explicitly or
implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, what are the facts on which the comment is being
made. Finally, the comment must be one which could have been made by an honest person,
however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views. For detailed
elaboration, see Albert Cheng And Another V. Tse Wai Chun Paul.
12 Le Cheng et al.
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is one of the most frequent defense types (Table 2). Examination of the concor-
dance of “defense/privilege” shows the phraseology defense of qualified privilege
(N = 35; Figure 3), suggesting that qualified privilege rather than privilege (3 out of
56, 5.4%) is a defense that is more acceptable in defamation cases.
The defense of privilege in Hong Kong, according to Mau (2010: 75), can be
divided into absolute privilege and qualified privilege. Absolute privilege
includes judicial, parliamentary, and official statements; the defense of qualified
privilege puts the onus of proof on the defendant to prove that such a privilege
is reasonably used only on occasions where the communicator has an interest or
duty to convey a statement to the receiver, who has a legitimate interest or duty
to receive it (Mau 2010: 75). Further searches in the corpus found no occurrence
of “defense/absolute/privilege,” which may be interpreted as in Hong Kong,
judicial, parliamentary, and official statements do not constitute defamation.
3.2.3 Justification
Justification is a well-established traditional defense in defamation and also one
of the defenses in Hong Kong (Figure 4). The co-selection of “defense/justifica-
tion” (N = 46) ranks only fourth in the corpus (Table 2), which can be explained
by the difficulty in the establishment of such a defense, and the effort made in
Hong Kong to minimize the chilling effect via other defenses, such as fair
comment and qualified privilege. Figure 4 shows that the defendant may put
forward the defense of justification (N = 28), but the defense of justification may
6       scintilla of evidence is required to destroy the defense of qualified privilege.  17. In Mckenzie, ClarkJA  
7        (5) If the answer to Issue(4)(b) is yes, is the defense of qualified privilege nevertheless defeated by    
8        be left to the jury is no different whether the defense is qualified privilege or fair comment and that    
9      was the same as the malice that would defeat a defense of qualified privilege.  As explained by Lord      
10        an opportunity of pleading, if so advised, a defense of qualified privilege on the principles of        
11     a piece of responsible journalism to which the defense of qualified privilege was available.  146.        
12       exist are not the same.  The rationale of the defense of qualified privilege is the law’s recognition   
13      of the word.  This is so in the context of the defense of qualified privilege.  It is no wonder that      
14   been comprehensively analysed in relation to the defense of qualified privilege, most notably in the        
15      be untrue.  43. It follows that, subject to any defense of qualified privilege, ATOL must be liable to     
Figure 3: Sample concordance lines from the two-word concgram “defense/privilege”.
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fail (line 13), and it may be non-maintainable (line 19), rejected (line 11),
abandoned (line 17), or no longer pursued (line 14).
3.2.4 Malice
The concordance of “defense/malice” (N = 33) was examined.
Findings show that malice is to defeat different types of defense, as in to
defeat the defense of fair comment by alleging “malice” (line 4), the pleading of
the defense of justification may be evidence of malice (line 6), and the issue of
malice in the defense of qualified privilege (line 12; Figure 5). In other words, if
the plaintiff can prove malice on the part of the defendant, even if the defenses
4      agreed.  Here the plaintiff sought to defeat the defense of fair comment by alleging “malice” but he      
5        to have been made with honest belief and the defense would only be defeated by proof of malice.  The    
6           It has been stated that the pleading of the defense of justification may be evidence of malice, but    
8               For the above reasons, I rule that the defense of qualified privilege is defeated by malice.  X.  
10          are that all the defendants established the defense of fair comment but the plaintiff proved malice
12      the jury to decide on the issue of malice in the defense of qualified privilege.  16. The head-note of      
13        the plaintiff has proved malice to defeat the defense.  81. The verdict in favour of the 3rd defendant  
Figure 5: Sample concordance lines from the two-word concgram “defense/malice”.
11        the substance of it.  The judge rejected the defense of justification because the appellants' plea of   
12      am satisfied that the defendant put forward the defense of justification in relation to the 1st to         
13        that the defendant has failed to establish the defense of justification for each of the 1st to            
14      the trial the defendants no longer pursued their defense of justification.  What I have called a confusing  
15       the action on the ground that the defendants’ defense of justification succeeded.  The judge also said   
16     they are pleadings of evidence in support of the defense of justification and as such the same is           
17      that, despite her counsel’s abandonment of the defense of justification on the allegation that the        
18     of what is asserted to establish the common law defense of justification may well deter a would-be critic  
19     ground.  C. Maintaining the non-maintainable defense of justification  In Gatley, the learned editors   
20       over the top in so alleging.  I now turn to the defense of justification.  VII. ISSUE(4)(A) – IS THE
Figure 4: Sample concordance lines from the two-word concgram “defense/justification”.
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are established, the defendant is still liable for his defamation. This can be
further confirmed by examining the concordance of the three-word concgram
“defense/malice/defeat” (Figure 6).
Figure 6 shows that as long as the plaintiff can prove malice (line 2), such
malice would defeat a defense of fair comment (lines 3–7) or a defense of
qualified privilege (line 8). Figure 6 also shows that malice is more often used
to defeat fair comment (75%, 6 of 8 instances) than to defeat qualified privilege
(12.5%, 1 out of 8) and this finding concurs with previous ones that fair com-
ments are used more frequently as defense than qualified privilege (Table 2).
3.3 Determining meaning in defamation cases
Table 5 shows the top 20 co-selections with defamation.
Table 5: Top 20 co-selections with defamation.
Co-selection Freq. Co-selection Freq.
 law   Meaning 
 plaintiff   Only 
 Ordinance   whether 
 us   where 
 no   Kong 
 should   See 
 under   falsehood 
 one   Its 
 proceedings   Japan 
 may   malicious 
1      defeat the defense of fair comment by alleging “malice” but he could in no way invite an inference of    
2       to the question whether the plaintiff has proved malice to defeat the defense.  81. The verdict in favour  
3           pleaded was capable in law of constituting malice to defeat the defense of fair comment. No         
4         is on the 2ndplaintiff.  Now, the reason why malice would defeat the defense of fair comment is that   
5          is on the 2nd plaintiff.  Now, the reason why malice would defeat the defense of fair comment is that   
6           extent elsewhere, that in defamation law the malice that would defeat a defense of fair comment was    
7       judgment in Cheng v. Tse where the confines of “malice” which might defeat a defense of fair comment     
8         a defense of fair comment was the same as the malice that would defeat a defense of qualified      
Figure 6: Sample concordance lines from the three-word concgram “malice/defeat/defense”.
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As shown in Table 5, in addition to co-selecting the procedural lexis (e.g., law,
plaintiff, Ordinance), the word defamation particularly co-selects derogatory
words (falsehood, malicious), which indicates that a negative attitude toward
defamation, as one would normally expect. The word meaning ranks high
(eleventh) among others, indicating that once a defamation claim comes to the
court (with the procedural lexis as the indication of the court as the scene and
setting), the very first task for the court to deal with is the meaning of words
(also see Table 7).
An analysis of all of the 306 concordance lines with defamatory as the origin
shows many lexical words at N + 1 of defamatory (Table 6).
Table 6 shows that among the most frequent lexical words are three types of
nouns: reporting nouns (statement(s), imputation(s), comment(s), words,
remarks, reports and terms), material nouns (publication(s), article, letters, mate-
rial and radio), and denoting nouns (meaning(s), sense). The first finding is that
reporting nouns usually report on the sources, i.e., the authors of the defamatory
expressions, which is very important to identify the defendant. Second, material
nouns indicate what kinds of medium is used for the dissemination of the
expression, which is vital to distinguish between slander and libel on the one
hand and provide prime facie evidence on the other because evidence cannot
exist in vacuum but rather is transmitted or conveyed via a certain type of
medium. In each and every case, evidence is both crucial and necessary in
winning a case. All the activities in court proceedings by lawyers on behalf of
the litigants and judges revolve around the identification and exanimation of
evidence. Evidence exists in the forms of substance, object, and equipment.
With reference to evidence, defamation cases do not make much difference, so
lexical words that express substances, materials, objects, and equipment count
Table 6: Co-selection patterns at N+ 1 of defamatory.
Co-selection Freq. Co-selection Freq.
 statement(s)   content 
 meaning(s)   sense 
 imputation(s)   letters 
 comment(s)   nature 
 words   action 
 matter(s)   material 
 charge(s)   radio 
 publication(s)   remarks 
 sting   reports 
 article   terms 
16 Le Cheng et al.
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for almost 60% among the top 20 lexical words at the N+ 1 of defamatory. Third,
denoting nouns (30%) are concerned about meaning, which is highly essential
in defamatory cases.
The importance of meaning in defamation cases is clearly reflected in the co-
selection patterns with defamation (see Table 5) and defamatory (see Table 6) as
origins, as well as the frequency of meaning (N = 345, 0.07%; Table 1). In other
words, one of the most important tasks in defamation cases is to identify the
meaning of words. A closer examination of the most frequent ten co-selected
words of meaning (Table 7) shows that other than words (N = 79), the most
frequent co-selected words are ordinary (N = 68) and natural (N = 62).
The corpus was further searched for the three-word concgram “meaning/
ordinary/natural” (N = 57).
Concordance analysis reveals both the phraseologies natural and ordinary mean-
ing (N = 37, 65%) and ordinary and natural meaning (N = 19, 33.3%) co-selecting the
words in question/complained of (see the samples in Figure 7), indicating that one vital
issue indefamationcases is theordinaryandnaturalapproach to themeaningofwords
(N = 79). Such an approach is supported in Gatley (Busuttil et al. 2008: 81): “[w]ords
are normally construed in their natural and ordinary meaning, i.e., the meaning in
which reasonable people of ordinary intelligence, with the ordinary person’s general
knowledge and experience of worldly affairs, would be likely to understand them.”
Defamation may arise from the ordinary and natural meaning of the words
complained of, and defamation based on innuendo.14 A further examination of
Table 7: Top 10 co-selections of meaning.
Origin Co-selection Freq.
 meaning words 
 meaning ordinary 
 meaning natural 
 meaning within 
 meaning pleaded 
 meaning plaintiff 
 meaning no 
 meaning paragraph 
 meaning understood 
 meaning meanings 
14 HCA 3831 [1997] Oriental Press Group Ltd. V. Next Magazine Publishing Ltd. And Others;
Reported in: [2000] 3 HKLRD 412 citing Lord Devlin in Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] 1 AC
234, 281.
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the corpus shows that the frequency of natural and ordinary meaning and
ordinary and natural meaning (N = 57) is much higher than that of innuendo
(N = 8) and innuendos (N = 2). Therefore, it can be said that in the defamation
cases in Hong Kong, the principle of determining defamation is the natural and
ordinary approach, which is context-dependent, rather than the inference of
defamatory meaning based on innuendo, which is plainly defamatory. More
importantly, abiding the natural and ordinary principle, the standard is objective.
In other words, such a literal meaning is decided with reference to the world
knowledge of the members of the public. However, in the context of innuendo, a
subjective standard is adopted, since “we are not concerned with the knowledge
of the members of the public, but with that of the readers of the article to whom
the words are published.”15 Such subjectivity usually makes the proof on the part
of the plaintiff difficult and sometimes even inadmissible, which can explain why
there are only a few defamation cases based on innuendo.
In the corpus of defamation law in Hong Kong, innuendo only appears 8
times and innuendos only 2 times in only three judgments.16 In all the three
cases, none of the defamation claims based on innuendo was supported by the
courts. The small number of innuendo cases can be explained by the risk that
may be incurred for a party to lodge a defamation suit where the meaning of the
words is still implicit or arguable.
14       and 93. Second, the ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal  
17      of 24September 1997 in its ordinary and natural meaning meant and was understood to mean that:  ¨(1)  Dr  
18       the 17October letter in its ordinary and natural meaning meant and was understood to mean that:  ¨(1)      
19          used can be part of the ordinary and natural meaning.  The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore   
21          11 It is not clear if on a natural and ordinary meaning, the defendant meant that the slanders were laid   
22          in his findings as to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.  As to the correct approach of an    
23       was not defamatory.  The natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the First Statement perceived by   
24          these words to bear the natural and ordinary meaning of the plaintiffs appearing ¨to be wanting to     
Figure 7: Sample concordance lines from the three-word concgram “meaning/natural/
ordinary”.
15 Oriental Press Group Ltd. V. Next Magazine Publishing Ltd. And Others; Reported in: [2000]
3 HKLRD 412.
16 Oriental Press Group Ltd. V. Next Magazine Publishing Ltd. And Others; Reported in: [2000]
3 HKLRD 412; Nam Tai Electronics, Inc. V. Pricewaterhouse Coopers; Reported in: [2005] 2
HKLRD 461; Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd V. The Associated Press; Reported in: [1997]
HKLRD 1073.
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4 Conclusion
This study shows how a corpus-based study enables us to visit the fundamental
issues in defamation cases in Hong Kong. The evidence-based study concludes
that the primary concerns in Hong Kong’s case law on defamation are the defenses
to defamation and the approach to meaning. The ordinary and natural approach to
the meanings of words provides a pivotal means to solve the threshold problem in
defamation cases, that is, whether the words involved are defamatory or not. The
defenses to defamation, particularly the evolution from fair comment to honest
comment, have gained more room for freedom of speech in Hong Kong and greater
attention to Hong Kong’s judicial practice from other common law jurisdictions.
The findings related to the adoption of an ordinary and natural approach to the
determination of meaning seem to match the expectation since such an approach
is well-established in defamation cases. However, the finding regarding the shift in
the defense from fair comment to honest comment indicates the feasibility and
prominence of using a corpus-based approach to track the latest development in
defamation law. When dealing with defamation, judges in Hong Kong will weigh
the balance between freedom of speech and protection of reputation. There is a
trend from emphasizing reputation to highlighting freedom of speech in Hong
Kong that can be demonstrated from the evolution of defenses to defamation.
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